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Legislation to create electronic healthcare records and provide electronic 
healthcare services requires the same level of privacy and disclosure regulations as are 
applicable to the current practices for paper based patient health records. Most of work in 
this area has been organization-oriented that deals with exchange of information among 
healthcare organizations (such as referrals). However, the requirements for ensuring 
security and privacy of information for online access and sharing of health records in a 
federated healthcare environment have not been adequately addressed. To address this 
problem, we have developed a context-aware content-based access control policy 
specification framework, known as Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control 
model (X-GTRBAC). This framework has been prototyped using an XML-driven 
federated environment that is comprised of synthetic healthcare multimedia databases. 
Our system integrates both privacy and disclosure policies with well-known healthcare 
standards used in the industry in order to specify the precise requirements of a practical 
healthcare system. In particular, the prototype uses the Clinical Document Architecture 
(CDA) of the Health Level 7 (HL7) organization as the underlying information model, 
and provides a methodology for associating user and environmental context parameters, 
with HL7 Reference Information Model [1]. The X-GTRBAC specification language 
used in this prototype can be broadly applied to a wide range of distributed and disparate 












1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  
In the past few decades, availability of wireless networks has provided the end 
user with new ways of accessing the computer services. Modern user can access available 
information with their hand held devices (such as PDA’s and cell phone etc) at any time 
and from anywhere [2]. Such new facilities have given birth to new challenges in the area 
of information security and distributed computing. Traditional service providers have 
been assuming context as a static parameter (information retrieval is independent of 
context and access device characteristics) while applying access control policies. Context 
can be user location at the time request is made, it may be the time when this request was 
initiated or it can be specific activity during which that request is raised. User identity can 
also be taken as a context parameter.  
However in today’s pervasive computing environment, users are mobile and 
information retrieval can vary greatly based on the user contextual information. Access 
control decisions may change even within the same domain, as the user changes it context 
(context can be changed with the change in one or all of the context parameters such as 
location, time, identity or activity) that can impact resource visibility [2]. Consider an 
example of a health care practitioner who is providing medical treatment to a trauma 
patient. This medical treatment is an example of an activity context, if this health care 
practitioner needs an access to the patient medical history, logically access to this 
sensitive medical information should automatically be privileged because of the context 
in which this health care practitioner is requesting the information is critical and involves 
life threatening situation. Old systems do not take contextual information into 
consideration at the time of applying their access control policies and therefore these are 
insufficient to handle requests coming from different contexts. Above discussion leads us 
to the need of having novel solutions that provide context based access control to the 
mobile users. Design of such systems that are context aware impose new challenges to the 
computer scientists as they have to reconsider the traditional subject based access control 
model that evaluates the permission of requesting party based on the identity [2] 




Federated database system (FDBS) consists of component database systems 
(DBS) that can be characterized by the autonomy, heterogeneity and distributed nature 
[3]. In a federation each component system is autonomous because it is not under any 
centralized control, it has its own system policies that are not affected by the local 
policies of other component systems. Heterogeneous behavior of federated database 
system (FDBS) can be due to one of following reasons as discussed in [3], difference in 
the hardware, system software, communication systems and database management system 
(DBMS) in underlying database system. Component DBS running different data base 
management software make DBS system heterogeneous due to difference in DBMS’s. As 
every component database system has its own internal data storage so data is distributed 
in multiple component database systems. Context based access control becomes really 
important in federated database systems because information is distributed and different 
domains collaborate to fulfill the user requests. If context information is not considered in 
access control decisions, it can cause security breach that can result in information 
retrieval to unauthorized users.  
As discussed already in any federated environment access control policies should 
take contextual information into consideration before releasing any information to the end 
user. This problem of information security is more prominent in the area of health care 
services and there is a growing concern for robust security and privacy in the health care 
industry. The legislative culmination of this concern is in the form of The Health 
Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [4]. The enforcement of 
HIPAA to Electronic Health Record (EHR) posses a number of challenges which go 
beyond the issues of data storage, integration and delivery. One of the key challenges is 
the secure and privacy preserving provisioning of EHR data to distributed patients, 
physicians, hospitals, and insurance companies; most of whom are spread geographically 
and have varying levels of security and privacy privileges. The distributed and disparate 
nature of the healthcare industry requires standards for the exchange, management and 
integration of EHR data. To address these concerns we propose a context-aware and 
content-based access control policy which incorporates security and privacy of EHR 
records. In particular, we have chosen the Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) [5] 
standard, which is an emerging ANSI-certified standard from the Health Level Seven 
(HL7) organization. HL7 is a collaboration between information scientists and healthcare 
domain specialists for the standardization of all information concerning the healthcare 
arena. HL7 standards are the most commonly used message exchange mechanism in 




CDA provides a framework and semantics to represent all information generated 
in the health care industry. One of the interesting aspects of CDA is that it can be 
represented using XML, besides other representations (pdf, word doc, jpg etc). CDA can 
represent any form of healthcare documents like Discharge Summaries, Imaging Reports, 
Admission & Physical, Pathology Reports and so on. In addition to providing schematics 
for the information flow between humans objects (physicians, patients etc), CDA also 
provides data exchange between machine objects and executable processes such as 
environmental control devices and pathological testing equipment.  
Context of the users and environment play an important role in secure and private 
delivery of EHR records to their intended recipients. As discussed already, context 
includes activity, identity, location and time. Examples of activity in the health care 
environment could be an emergency or the act of doing a surgical operation; a patients 
user id or a physician’s Social Security Number (SSN) exemplifies identity; instances of 
location could be the emergency room, inside an ambulance or in a physicians office; and, 
time of the day defines the time context. It may be noted here that user credentials like the 
membership of a professional organization, degree, etc also constitute the identity 
context. These various categories of context have been defined in [6]. In our proposed 
access control policy, the permission to access complete or parts of CDA objects is based 
on context of the user/object and the environment. The CDA objects are tagged in the 
access control policy with the context parameters at the time of the policy definition and 
are evaluated at runtime. The granularity of this tagging is at the attribute level so as to 
provide the best possible resolution of privacy and security amidst changing user and 
object context.  
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has emerged as a de-facto means of 
managing security requirements of large organizations. Its strength lies in the definition of 
user roles more akin to the functional responsibilities of users in the organization and 
abstracting object permissions as roles [7]. The Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) 
incorporates a set of language constructs for the specification of various contextual 
constraints such as time [8]. X-GTRBAC, the recently defined GTRBAC policy model 
using XML [9], provides a compact and generic representation of access control policies 
which are content-based and context-aware. X-GTRBAC provides a generic and flexible 
framework for policy definition in healthcare and other application domains.  
In this thesis, we present a context-aware content-based access control policy for 
the healthcare domain. The policy uses CDA as the data model and provides attribute 




control policy incorporating activity, identity, location and time as the context parameters. 
We also present a software architecture for the application of this policy to CDA 
compliant documents and objects.  
 
1.2 Related Work 
 
In this thesis, we have provided a context aware, content based access control 
model for federated healthcare care domain using the X-GTRBAC policy specification 
language. There has been work already done in this area but none has provided such 
comprehensive policy specification for health care domain using CDA as the data model. 
Considerable amount of work on RBAC can be found in the literature [7,10, 11, 
12]. Schmidt [13] introduced a working model for context to generalize its concept for 
ubiquitous environments. Accordingly, the concept of context is structured to incorporate 
any description of a situation and the environment a device or user is in. Content-based 
access control (CBAC) models have been proposed for various applications. In [14], for 
example, a CBAC model for a digital library has been proposed. However, the model 
caters only to the textual content in digital archives and needs to be extended to capture 
specific requirements of XML document sources. The CBAC model also uses user 
credentials and concept hierarchies to assign rights of the objects to the subjects. While 
the use of credentials in CBAC allows one to specify a very flexible and fine-grained 
access control requirements, mapping them to subject roles adds in the benefit of the 
efficient and effective security management, particularly in an open environment like the 
Web where the user pool is not known a-priori. In [15], Giuri. present parameterized 
privileges and introduce the concept of role templates to allow specification of policies 
based on the content of the objects. The use of parameterized roles, where permissions 
are indexed by parameters, allows the same role definition to be utilized for multiple 
contexts. In another work by one of our investigators [16], Bertino present the main 
protection requirements posed by XML documents. They provide a set of authorization 
and dissemination policies for enabling a controlled access to XML documents and for 
exchanging XML documents across different sources. The proposed policies incorporate 
varying protection granularity levels and a view-based dissemination of XML documents 
to different users in order to differentiate access and dissemination based on user 







 We have adopted well know standards from health care industry knows as HL7 
CDA for our application that is an XML based markup standard, whose sole purpose it to 
standardize the clinical document for exchange. We have applied our access control 
policy to provide a comprehensive access control mechanism, that is both context aware 
and content based, at these standardize CDA documents. We have recognized that 
location, time, identity and even activity can be examples of context parameters in any 
organization. Currently our system is designed to capture the location context using 
internet protocol (IP) address associated with the incoming request. The information 
released from our system is totally based on the current context from which request is 
initiated. Our system is also capable to identify if there is a change in the context, if it 
detects any change in the context information it reevaluates the request against the access 
control policy for new context parameters.  
Federated database architecture design as proposed in [3] consists of a multi-level 
schema, consisting of a local schema, a component schema, an export schema, and the 
overall federated schema. This schema architecture allows the resulting database system 
to support already discussed three vital requirement of federated database system such as 
distribution, heterogeneity and autonomy. The federated system architecture presented in 
this thesis has been designed by following the guidelines presented in [3] to support all 
above requirements. We have also presented the design of service level agreements that 
define the rules of collaboration among federated domains.  
Our service level agreements have been designed using the X-GTRBAC policy 
specification language to maintain consistency with local policy. Every component DBS 
can contain N number of service level agreements depending on the type of 
collaborations defined. These agreement document have their own access control policies 
that differ from the original system policy.  These policies can be as simple as a subset of 
the existing system policy.  
 
1.3 Organization of thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the role based access 
control model (RBAC) and its extensions that leads to our policy specification language 
X-GTRBAC. In chapter 3 we discuss the architecture of a general federated database 




Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion on policy specification with the help of 
some examples from the health care domain. Chapter 5 discusses the detailed architecture 


















































This chapter provides the theoretical backgrounds on the national institute of 
standards and technology (NIST) role based access control (RBAC) model and its 
extensions (TRBAC, GTRBAC and X-GTRBAC). RBAC model consists of four 
components user sets, permission sets and session sets. In RBAC users are assigned to 
role and each role is a collection of permission to perform certain functionality in an 
organization. RBAC does not take care of temporal constraints such as temporal 
constraint on  role enabling/disabling. Temporal RBAC an extension to RBAC model 
allows the specifications of such temporal constraints. It uses role triggers to define the 
periodic enabling or disabling of roles or temporal dependencies among different roles.  
TRBAC does not provide any temporal constraint specification on user-role and 
permission-role assignments. Generalized TRBAC model extends the temporal constraint 
enforcement mechanism to user-to-role and permission to-role assignments. It thus allows 
the specification of a more complete set of temporal constraints related not only to role 
enabling, but also to user-to-role assignment, permission-to-role assignment, and role 
activation. X-GTRBAC is a policy specification language that model all the basic RBAC 
components using extensible markup language (XML). This policy specification language 
also provides specifications for all the temporal constraints defined in GTRBAC.  
 
2.1 Role Based Access Control Model ( RBAC)  
 
 RBAC as proposed by NIST consists of following four basic components, a set of 
users named as Users, a set of permissions called as Permissions, a set of roles Roles and 
a set of sessions Sessions [10]. User can be a human being or it can be an automated 
agent such as machines. Collection of permissions to perform certain functionality in an 
organization is called as roles. Permission define the mode of access that can be 
performed on an object in a system and a session relates a user to possibly many roles. A 




is enabled at the time user made a request for activation and the user is entitled to activate 
the role at that time. If the activation request is satisfied, the user issuing the request 
obtains all the permissions associated with the role he/she has requested to activate. In 
RBAC fundamental sets are Users, Permissions, Roles and Sessions, other relations are 
defined based on these basic sets. The assignments of user to role are defined by user role 
assignment (UA) and assignment of permission to role relations is maintained by 
permission role assignment (PA). 
User functions maps each session to a single user and similarly role functions 
creates a mapping between a session and a set of roles activated by the corresponding user 
in that particular session. RBAC also maintains a hierarchy relation on roles that is 
denoted by ≤ and for roles ri, rj ϵ Roles, if ri ≤ rj, then all the permissions of rj  will be 
inherited by ri and in this case rj  will be considered as a senior role and ri will be taken as 
a junior role. RBAC model can be summarized as follows as discussed in [9,10]. 
 
• Sets Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions representing the set of users, 
roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively; 
• PA: Roles → Permissions, relation that assigns permissions to roles 
• UA: Users→Roles, relation that assigns user to roles 
• user: Sessions → Users, which maps each session to a single user 
• role: Sessions → 2Roles that maps each session to a set of roles 
• RH ⊆ Roles × Roles, a partially ordered role hierarchy (written ≥) 
                  
One of the most powerful feature that comes with RBAC is that it assigns permissions to 
the roles instead of applying directly to the users. This reduces the management overhead 
by a great value. Security administrators create roles so that they can  categorize the users 
having same functional capabilities.  To add a new functionality a new role is created and 
users who assume these role can perform all new functionalities associated with this new 
role. Similarly if a user is deactivated from a role, he can no longer be able to perform 
those set of permissions that are associated with the particular role. 
 
2.2 Temporal RBAC (TRBAC)  
 
An initial temporal extension to RBAC has been proposed in the temporal RBAC  





functions may have limited or periodic temporal duration. Consider an example of nurse 
practitioner, who is authorized to assist in surgery  only when the surgeon is on duty. This 
implies that nurse role should be enabled only for the duration when a surgeon role is 
enabled. TRBAC allows the specifications of such temporal roles constraints. It uses role 
triggers to define the periodic enabling, disabling of roles or temporal dependencies 
among different roles. These triggers sets up the rule and are automatically fired based on 
the event of either enabling or disabling of roles. 
TRBAC also associates the priorities with triggers and periodic enabling or 
disabling of roles, if there is a need of enabling/disabling of role simultaneously. In 
addition TRBAC  allows system administrator to issue run-time requests for enabling and 
disabling a role and restricted handling of role activations by a user. TRBAC, however, is 
inadequate to express a variety of useful temporal constraints. TRBAC does not provide 
any specification on enforcing temporal constraints on (i) user to role assignment and 
permission to role assignment (ii) role activation by user. TRBAC assumes the only roles 
can be enabled or disabled at different time intervals however the next extension to 
TRBAC named as GTRBAC assumes that not only roles but also users and permissions 
assigned to them are in transient [8]. Because TRBAC does not consider role activation 
by user therefore it does not use a well-defined, separate notion of role enabling and role 
activation, and hence cannot enforce a fine-grained access control at the user level for 
role activation.  
 
2.3 Generalized Temporal RBAC (TRBAC)  
 
The GTRBAC model distinguishes between the notions of role activation from 
that of role enabling to incorporate various activation constraints on role activations at the 
individual user level. It also extends the temporal constraint enforcement mechanism to 
user-to-role and permission to-role assignments. It thus allows the specification of a more 
complete set of temporal constraints related not only to role enabling, but also to user-to-
role assignment, permission-to-role assignment, and role activation. In GTRBAC role can 
be in one of three states enabled, disabled or active. As discussed in [8], a role is enabled 
when any user having required authorization can use this role in a session,  Such a state of 
role is considered as enabled. Role is in disabled state when no user can get the set of 
permissions associated with this role in a session however it can be enabled. A role is said 
to be in active state when some user has assumed that role. In active state there should be 




longer assumed by any user in any session, it will automatically switch its state from 
active to enabled. GTRBAC model as discussed in literature [8], allows the specifications 
of following types of constraints. 
 













(I, P, pr:assignU/deassignU r to u)  
Role enabling 
(I, P, pr:enable/disable r) 
Role-permission assignment 




([(I, P)| D], DU, pr:assignU/deassignU r  to u) 
Role enabling 
([(I, P)| D], DR, pr:enable/disable r ) 
Role-permission assignment 






Total active role 
duration 
Per-role ([(I, P)| D], Dactive, [Ddefault], pr:activeR_total r) 
Per-user-role ([(I, P)| D], Duactive, u, pr:activeUR_total r) 
Max role duration per 
activation 
Per-role ([(I, P)| D], Dmax, pr:activeR_max r ) 




Total no. of 
activations 
Per-role ([(I, P)| D], Nactive, [Ndefault], pr:activeR_n r ) 
Per-user-role ([(I, P)| D], Nuactive, u, pr:activeUR_n r) 
Max. no. of 
concurrent activations 
Per-role ([(I, P)| D], Nmax, [Ndefault], pr:activeR_con r) 




enable/disable c  










 (pr:assignU/de-assignU r to u after ∆t) 
 (pr:enable/disable r after ∆t) 
 (pr:assignP/de-assignP p to r after ∆t) 
 (pr:enable/disable c after ∆t) 






(1) Temporal constraints on role enabling, permission to role and user to  
role assignments. 
(2) Specify constraints on role activation 
(3) Run-time events 
(4) Constraint enabling expressions  
(5) Triggers 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes different types of constraints and expressions as proposed 
by the GTRBAC model. 
 GTRBAC defines periodic expressions as a tuple ( [begin, end],P) as shown in 
table 2.1, where P is the periodic time expression that denotes the infinite set of periodic 
time instants, and [begin, end] sets the upper and lower bounds in a periodic time 
expression. Periodic time uses the definition of calendar that consists of countable set of 
contiguous intervals [11]. Calendars can be Years, Months, Weeks, Days and Hours, 
where Hours calendars provide the finest granularity. 
Consider two calendars C1 and C2, C1 is said to be the sub-calendar of C2  if each 
interval of C1 is covered by intervals of C2 .These calendars can be represented by more 
general expression by defining a periodic expression that sums all the expression from i= 
1 to n as: P = ∑Oi.Ci x.Cd, where Cd, C1, …, Cn are calendars and  O1 = all, Oi ∈ 2 
∪{all}, Ci  Ci-1 for i = 2,.., n, Cd  Cn, and x ∈ . Symbol  separates the first part of 
the periodic expression that distinguishes the set of starting points of the intervals, from 
the specification of the duration of each interval in terms of calendar Cd. For example, 
{all.Months + {1, 3}.Weeks  2.Weeks} represents the set of intervals having a duration 
of 2 weeks that have starting time that overlaps with the same instant as the first or the 
third week of every month. 
GTRBAC proposes that all these periodicity and duration constraints discussed 
already and explained in the table 2.1, can be applied to different major components of 
RBAC. Using these periodic and duration constrains, these ideas can also be applied to 










2.3.1 Periodicity Constrains  
 
These constraints are used to specify the exact time interval during which a role 
can be enabled or disabled or a user can be assigned to a role or permission can be 
assigned to a role.  
 
2.3.2 Duration Constrains 
 
These constraints are used to specify the exact duration of times during which a 
role can be enabled or disabled or a user can be assigned to a role or permission can be 
assigned to a role. In case of triggering of an event these duration constraints associated 
with that event validate the event for that particular duration. 
 
2.3.3 Role Activation Constraint  
 
Roles are activated at user request, this implies that only duration constraints can 
be applied on role activation. GTRBAC model classify these constraints as total active 
duration constraint and maximum duration per activation constraint. Total active duration 
limits the length of role activation to the specified value. Once that period has utilized for 
a specific user and specific role, role can not be activated for that user even if the role is 
still in the enabled state. Maximum active duration sets the maximum allowable duration 
for each activation of a role. Once this duration expires for a user, that particular user can 
not activate this role again. 
 
2.3.4 Triggers and Run Time Events  
 
GTRBAC proposes all the request from user can be considered as run time events. 
Sometimes it is required that a set of events be executed as a result of execution of one 
particular event.  Consider an example an example of hospital system where role of night 
doctor is enabled every night after 9pm, it is also needed that role of nurse practitioner 
should be automatically enabled once the night doctor role is enabled.  In this situation 
enabling of nurse practitioner is dependent on the enabling of night doctor role. GTRBAC 
model such dependencies with the help of triggers where an event can fire trigger that 
initiates another event until execution of all the dependent events is finished. Further 





2.4. X-GTRBAC Policy Specification 
 
This section describes the key features of X-GTRBAC (XML-based Generalized 
Temporal Role Based Access Control), the XML-based policy specification language in 
our federated healthcare information management framework[9]. This specification 
language is an extension of the RBAC model which is famous for its support for 
simplified administration in computer systems at large scale [10]. As already discussed, 
the main idea behind RBAC is that permissions are assigned to roles (as opposed to users 
directly) and users are assigned to roles to access the associated permissions. This 
simplifies administration of privileges because the permissions are assigned to a user 
based on their job functions (i.e. roles) and a change in the job function only means re-
assigning the user to a different role, and the permissions are appropriately reconfigured 
for the user. Various constraints on the assignment of permissions to roles and of users to 
roles, together with the use of role-specific constraints using the notion of role attributes, 
role hierarchy and role-based separation of duty (SoD), makes it possible to exercise fine-
grained context-aware access control in RBAC. In the following sub-section, we describe 
some of features of X-GTRBAC policy specification language that is designed to 
accomplish this task. 
 
2.4. 1. Policy Language 
 
X-GTRBAC language specification is captured through a context-free grammar 
called X-Grammar, which follows the same notion of terminals and non-terminals as in 
Backus-Naur Form (BNF), but supports the tagging notation of extensible markup 
language (XML) which also allows expressing attributes within element tags [9,17]. The 
use of attributes helps maintain compatibility with XML schema syntax, which serves as 
the type definition model for our language. 
            XML comes with the power of representing data in an organized manner. It 
facilitates the sharing of structured data among different component system in distributed 
computing environment. User can define their own tags that makes an XML document an 
easy to understand document. The no terminals are expressed as <!--




of the values of elements or attributes are indicated inside parenthesis “( )” symbol. The 
complete syntax of XGTRBAC language specification appears in Appendix A.  
 
2.4.2. Policy Components 
 
In this section we will discuss the main component of X-GTRBAC policy 
specification language that are used to create access control policy for an enterprise.  All 
the primary policy sheets are maintained in following XML policy documents XUS, 
XRS, XPS, XURAS and XPRAS. Now we will provide a brief introduction to these 
policy documents. For detailed discussion, interested readers are referred to [9,18]. 
 
2.4.2.1 XML User Sheet (XUS) 
 
All the information needed to authenticate a user to, assigning a user to a role is 
provided in XUS XML policy document. These qualified attributes that are required to 
authenticate a user are called as credentials. Examples of such credentials can be 
employer ID, social security number or driver’s license. 
 
2.4.2.2 XML Role Sheet (XRS) 
 
Information needed to assign permission to a role is maintained in XML role 
sheets. These attributes are called as role attributes. Example of such attribute would be 
time of day and activity etc. Refer to appendix B for further details. 
 
2.4.2.3 XML User to Role Assignment Sheet ( XURAS) 
 
All the rules that are needed to assign user to a role are defined in these user-to-
role assignment sheets. Users are assigned to roles if they provide same set of credentials 
(these credentials are provided in XUS) as is needed by user-to-role assignment sheet. 
Refer to appendix B for further details. 
 
2.4.2.4 XML Permission to Role Assignment Sheet ( XPRAS) 
 
All the rules that are needed to assign permission to a role are defined in these 




match with the set of credentials attributes for roles. This sheet maintains all the 
permissions assigned to a particular role.  
 
2.4.2.5  X-GTRBAC Constraint Sheets 
 
X-GTRBAC also models all the temporal constraint definitions presented in the 
GTRBAC model. The policy sheets that contains these temporal constraints are called as 
XML separation of duty definition sheet (XSoDDef) and XML temporal constraint 
definition sheet (XTempConstDef). Examples of separation of duty (SoD) constraints are 
static SoD (SSD) (assignment time) and dynamic SoD (DSD) (activation time) 
constraints. Temporal constraints include the periodic or duration constraints on user-role 





















3. ACCESS CONTROL IN FEDERATED DATABASE SYSTEMS 
 
 
Federated Database (FDBS) consists of collection of database systems (DBS) that 
can be characterized by distributed, heterogeneous and autonomous nature of component 
systems [3]. Databases are distributed, as they may be stored on a single computer system 
or on systems that are running on geographically different locations. Federated databases 
are built on these distributed database systems (DBS) that abstract the distributed nature 
of data from end users. Heterogeneous behavior of federated database system (FDBS) can 
be due to following different reasons as discussed in [3], difference in the hardware, 
system software, communication systems and database management system (DBMS) in 
underlying database system. Component DBS running different data base management 
software make DBS system heterogeneous due to difference in DBMS’s.  
 
 
    
 




Heterogeneity caused due to disagreement about the meaning, interpretation or 
intended use of related or same data is called semantic heterogeneity. To explain this kind 
of heterogeneity, let us take an example from health care domain, consider two 
autonomous domains D1 and D2 using the attribute named “Dose”  to record the amount 
of medication. However the units to measure the dose quantity are different in both 
domains. If health care practitioner from domain D1 tries to compare his measured dose 
quantity with the dose measurement in domain D2, results will be misleading as these 
two systems are semantically heterogeneous.  
Organizational entities in a federated database system are usually autonomous. 
These entities may want to share the information with the users of other domains 
provided these are still maintaining the ownership of the data. Autonomy can be of 
divided into execution autonomy (order to perform external and local operations without 
external interference) or design autonomy (ability to choose own design relating to data 
management, data representation and semantic interpretation of data). An example of a 
federated database system has been shown in the figure 3.1. It consists of N number of 
component DBS that are the part of this federation. All these component database 
systems are autonomous, distributed and heterogeneous in nature. In the coming sub 
sections of this chapter we will provide some insight on the design of such federated 
database system and will explain that why does context become so important in a 
federated database system environment. 
 
3.1 Federated Collaboration 
  
 Collaboration in federated database systems can be characterized by the extent of 
mutual dependence and the level of trust among the collaborating domains [19]. An 
application that provides set of services by integrating several other applications can be 
considered as federated collaborative system. Federated collaborations are designed to 
support distributed applications that are time sensitive and safety-critical and require high 
degree of information sharing among collaborating domains [19]. 
 Providing secure and timely access to the sensitive information in a federated 
multi domain environment requires the definition of global meta policy that can be  used 
to define the access privileges of user from one domain over the secure information 
resource in other domain. There are two key advantages of using a meta-policy based 
approach: 1) it provides a single interface for accessing information and data resources 




differences among the local policies of different domains. 2) This meta-policy can also 
lead to the development of secure distributed applications in the federated system. To 
provide secure interoperation, the proposed meta policy should be consistent with the 
local policies of the domains. 
 Design of meta policy is a real challenge as it should be designed in such a way 
that it does not allow any inter domain access that can violate the constraints set by local 
policy on any domain. Some conflicts may arise because different domains in federation 
may use different models, semantics, schema format, data labeling schemes, and 
constraints on restricting the local information flow. Our federated secure database 
system include such policies in documents called service level agreements that consists of 
a meta policy that is used for inter domain collaborations.. 
 
3.2 Federated Data Base Architecture 
 
Federated healthcare database system architecture proposed in thesis is based on 
the well-established Federated Database System (FDBS) architecture described in 
literature [3, 17, 20, 21]. To summarize, such an architecture consists of a multi-level 
schema, consisting of a local schema, a component schema, an export schema, and the 
overall federated schema. This schema architecture allows the resulting database system 
to support already discussed three vital requirement of federated database system such as 
distribution, heterogeneity and autonomy. A local schema is the conceptual schema of a 
component database system expressed in the native data model of the component DBMS, 
and hence different local schemas may be expressed in different data models. A 
component schema is derived by translating local schemas into a data model called the 
canonical or common data model (CDM) of the FDBS. Two reasons for defining 
component schemas in a CDM are (i) they describe the divergent local schemas using a 
single representation and (ii) semantics that are missing in a local schema can be added to 
its component schema. Thus they facilitate negotiation and integration tasks performed 
when developing a tightly coupled FDBS. Similarly, they facilitate negotiation and 
specification of views and multi-database queries in a loosely coupled FDBS. 







 Figure 3.2  Five Level Schema Hierarchy in FDBS 
 
The process of schema translation from a local schema to a component schema 
generates the mappings between component schema objects and local schema objects. An 
export schema represents a subset of a component schema that is available to the FDBS 
as shown in the figure 3.2. The purpose of defining export schemas is to facilitate control 
and management of association autonomy. A federated schema is an integration of 
multiple export schemas. A federated schema also includes the information on data 
distribution that is generated when integrating export schemas. This architecture forms 
the baseline for the design and operation of an FDBS. Our design of a federated 
healthcare database system assumes that the distributed databases form a loosely coupled 
federation of multiple databases. Of particular relevance to us in this architecture are the 
concepts of CDM, and the federated schema. We will present in coming section the 
policy definitions that act as the CDM throughout the healthcare federation, and will be 
used by each participating site to encode their export schemas. The integration of these 
schemas will then constitute the federated schema. The policy framework that we have 




FDBS architecture. Notable among the implementations reported in the literature are the 
Mermaid by Templeton. [22], IRO-DB [23], Disco [24]. 
 
3.3 Significance of Context is important in Federated Database Systems 
 
As we have discussed already that, the availability of wireless networks has 
provided the end user with novel ways of accessing the computer services. Hand held 
devices such as pocket PC, PDA etc has revolutionized the world that we have today. 
Mobile user can request for information with these hand held devices at any time and 
from anywhere [2]. Such new facilities have given birth to new challenges in the area 
information security and distributed computing. In old days it was assumed that context is 
a static parameter (information retrieval is independent of context and access device 
characteristics) while applying access control policies. Context can be user location at the 
time the request is made, it may be the time when this request is initiated or it can be 
specific activity during which that request is raised. User identity can also be taken as a 
context parameter.  
However in today’s pervasive federated computing environment, users are mobile 
and information content to be released can vary greatly based on the user contextual 
information at the time of request. Access control policies may need to respond 
differently even within the same network, as soon as there is a change in the context of 
user is captured (context can be changed with the change in one or all of the context 
parameters such as location, time or activity) resulting in a total different resource 
visibility [2]. Consider an example of natural calamity such as flood or earth quake, under 
these circumstances health care practitioner need more privileges to sensitive medical 
data as compared to the normal day life. There may be cases in these situations where 
patients need to be treated remotely as there is no local facility available or such facilities 
do not exist anymore to treat particular disease. Health care practitioner from remote 
medical facility has to access the medical history for the patient to provide better 
treatment. Under normal conditions this access should be restricted to maintain the 
privacy of patient medical record. However in emergency situation as discussed already 
health care practitioner access needs to be privileged. Above discussion implies that 
context in federated database system play a vital role and access control policies that do 
not take care of the context are not sufficient enough to deliver real services. Old systems 
do not take contextual information into consideration at the time of applying their access 




different contexts. Above discussion leads us to the need of having novel solutions that 
provide context based access control to the mobile users. Design of such systems that are 
context aware impose new challenges to the computer scientists as now they have to 
reconsider the traditional subject based access control model that evaluates the 
permission of requesting party based on the identity/roles [2] neglecting any context 
information. Next section explains the concepts in more details with the help of an 
example. 
 
3.3.1 Context Based Access Control in FBDS 
 
Consider an example of federated database system that is composed of three 
component database systems that are autonomous (as every DBS has its own access 
control policy and it can work independently), heterogeneous and distributed (Data is 
distributed in the three different data sources) . Each database system has following three 
major components, access control policy, database and access control processor. Access 
control policy is used to control information exchange. Database contains the data that 
needs to be protected. Access control processor is the major component in this system 
that applies the access control policy and retrieves the relevant data from the database and 
fulfills the request coming from other database systems. All three component DBS are 
located in geographically different locations and hence all three are in different context as 


















When a user queries the component database, DBS searches the requested 
resource in its local database, if the resource does exists in the local database, user request 
is satisfied by applying the local access control policy. When resource is not available 
locally, this DBS queries the neighboring DBS to find the requested resource. If the 
resource exists in the any of the component DBS, that DBS responds by sending the 
requested information. 
Now consider an example where user U2 queries the component DBS2 for 
resource R1, DBS2 scans its local database and does not find it. Similarly user U3 queries 
the component DBS3 and request for the resource R1, It scans its database but does not 
find it as well. In the next step both the component DBS’s queries their neighboring 
DBS’s to find the resource R1. DBS1 is the only  neighboring DBS, it receives the 
requests from both the DBS. In traditional computing where context was not considered 
as a parameter in the access control decisions, DBS1 will treat both the incoming request 
in a similar fashion and will apply its access control policy to see if requesting party has 
enough authorization to access this resource R1. Suppose both the request have enough 
credentials to be authorized by the access control processor of DBS1. R1 will be sent 
back to both the requesting parties. 
There is a problem with this design. Consider all these DBS are a part of car 
manufacturing factory. Let us assume that DBS1 is located in the facility where cars are 
assembled and technicians are authorized to access all the protected technical assembling 
manuals that provide the information about car assembly. However DBS2 is located in 
the area that is actually a public facility where any employee can access the information. 
Finally, DBS3 is a part of car design facility where car design manuals are maintained. 
Clearly traditional system will allow users to access information from the both the DBS’s, 
that will result in information security leakage. There can also be some sensitive data that 
any component database system does not want to share with any of the collaborating 
domains at all. To address all these issues we need to have some kind of architecture that 
does not assume context as a static parameter. 
Above federated system can prevent the discussed scenario by introducing the 
concept of context of requesting party during the evaluation of incoming requests 
authorizations. As DBS2 is in a different context than DBS3, access control policy should 
be able to recognize this difference and should be able to release the information 
accordingly. Context based access control in federated system can help securing the 
information in a better way. Our proposed federated system (discussed in coming section) 





3.4  Proposed Federated Database System Architecture 
 
As discussed already, secure federated healthcare system is a federated database 
system where data is distributed among multiple sources, heterogeneous and every 
component system is autonomous in nature.  In any federated database system data is 
distributed, a request may be satisfied by collecting data from multiple data sources in 
collaboration. This implies that database components may be sharing their data with other 
component systems in federation. In such an event there is great a need of strict access 
control policies to be implemented to deal with all of the security concerns. As already 
discussed, contextual parameters, In any enterprise, play an important role in access 
control decisions. We have identified location, time identity and activity can be such 
examples of contextual parameter in healthcare domain as well. We will provide further 
details on how these contextual parameters have been integrated in our system 
architecture in coming chapter. A high level functionality of our proposed federated 
health care system has been shown in figure 3.4. Every component database system in 
federated database system consists of following major modules a web server, a access 
control policy base, a context acquisition module, a database, and access control 
processor. All the component DBS are connected through a registered access point that is 
responsible for providing service in its service area. We call this as coverage area (CA) of 
a component DBS. DBS are equipped with web server to handle web requests. Each 
database contains the XML based patient electronic health records ( EHR ). Policy base 
works as a policy repository that is accessed by the access control processor while 
applying the access control policy. Policy base contains the policy files implemented 
using X-GTRBAC policy specification language. Policy base also contains the service 
level document (discussed in a later chapter) to handle request from other component 
database systems. Context acquisition module is used to capture the context information 
associated with the incoming request, once the context is determined this request is 
tagged base on current context. Once tagging is completed the request is passed  over to 
the access control processor. Access control processor applies the system policy and 
determines which content of requested document can be released based on the access 
control policy evaluation. 
Access control processor works as the brain for our secure federated health care 
system. User Request is routed to the access control processor, It queries context 






Figure 3.4 A Software Architecture for Secure Federated System 
 
Context acquisition module based on the current context provides the information 
about the policy that needs to be enforced to provide proper access control. Once this 
information is available to the access control processor, it applies the appropriate policy ( 
local policy in case of local request and SLA policy in case of remote request) and then 
requests the information from the data base. Data retrieved from the database is first 
filtered by system policy to determine which contents are to be sent back to the user based 























In this chapter , we have provided the design details for the major components of 
our secure federated healthcare system.  A comprehensive context aware and content 
based policy specification proposed in this chapter using the X-GTRBAC policy 
specification language is also outlined. This chapter also discusses how we have 
implemented our secure federated database system  that is in compliance with the famous 
health care information model from health level 7 (HL7) called as reference information 
model (RIM).     
 
4.1  Service Level Agreement (SLA) Design 
 
The proposed secure federated healthcare system allows collaboration among 
different organizations. Such collaboration leads us to requirement of having some kind 
of agreement among organizations that is agreed upon by all parties. We call this 
agreement as service level agreement (SLA). It sets up the rules that is followed by any 
domain that is in collaboration with any other domain. This sections provides guidelines 
for the design of SLA document for our federated system. 
  
4.1.1 Design Specification 
 
      Design of SLA can be divided into following two steps [25]. 
1- Identification of services 
2- Specification of the SLA document. 
 
4.1.1.1 Identification of services 
 
Consider a secure federated healthcare system that consists of ‘N’ numbers of 
Internet Data Centers (IDC’s). Each IDC is connected with an access point (AP) that is 




purposes that N=2, and these IDC’s can be labeled as IDC1 and IDC2. IDC1 is connected 
to registered AP1 and IDC2 is connected through registered AP2 that provide services in 
areas A1 and A2 as shown in the Figure 4.1.  
A user (U) who is registered user of IDC2, requesting the sensitive information 
being connected to IDC2 and in service area (A2). This request can be handled in one of 
following two scenarios (i) IDC2 already has the requested sensitive information in such 
a situation, IDC2 imposes its local access control policy to release the content of 
information to the requesting user (ii) IDC2 does not have the requested resource, in this 
case IDC2 queries other IDC’s that are the part of this federation. This implies other 
IDC’s must be able to recognize the incoming requests from neighboring domains and 
there must be an agreement on information retrieval among these domains. This get at 
that we need to have some rules of collaboration that has to followed before releasing the 
requested information. We call such an arrangement as service level agreement. The 
specifications  of this kind of agreement have been discussed in the next sub section.  
 
 





                        
4.1.1.2 Specification of SLA Document 
 
 As explained already, SLA is required if the domains need to collaborate with 
one another. The major challenges in the design of  SLA is make it standardize, scalable  
and inter operable document. To address the above stated issues, we propose XML-based 
policy specification language (X-GTRBAC) for design of SLA for our federated 
healthcare information management framework. The expressive power of XML as our 
document language has a built in solution to problems relating to readability and 
interoperability. As discussed in [17] “XML provides a uniform, vendor-neutral 
representation of enterprise data, and allows a mechanism for interchange, sharing and 
dissemination of information content across heterogeneous systems”. IDC’s have to agree 
on one schema definition for collaboration and all the documents conforming to unified 




<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<!DOCTYPE XPRAS SYSTEM "XPRAS_DTD.dtd"> 
 
<XPRAS xpras_id="HL7XPRAS">  
 <PRA pra_id="prasurgeon" role_name="surgeon"> 
    <AssignPermissions>       
     <AssignPermission perm_id="s1HL7_GET"> 
      <AssignConstraint> 
        <AssignCondition cred_type ="nill" d_expr_id="TwoWeeks" /> 
      </AssignConstraint> 
     </AssignPermission>  
        <AssignPermission perm_id="s2HL7_GET"/> 
        <AssignPermission perm_id="s3HL7_GET"/> 
    </AssignPermissions> 
 </PRA>  
 <PRA pra_id="pranurse" role_name="nurse_practioner"> 
    <AssignPermissions>       
     <AssignPermission perm_id="s3HL7_GET"> 
     </AssignPermission>  
    </AssignPermissions> 









SLA for secure federated healthcare system consists of two components (i) an 
access control policy and (ii) a role and permission mapping module. SLA Access control 
policy can be a as simple as a subset of access control policy that is pre-specified using X-
GTRBAC policy language for a particular domain. If P is the access control policy 
enforced by the IDC, SLA can be just be a subset of P that can be represented as P*.  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<!DOCTYPE XPRAS SYSTEM "XPRAS_DTD.dtd"> 
 
<XPRAS xpras_id="HL7XPRAS">  
 <PRA pra_id="prasurgeon" role_name="surgeon"> 
    <AssignPermissions>       
     <AssignPermission perm_id="s1HL7_GET"> 
      <AssignConstraint> 
        <AssignCondition cred_type ="nill" d_expr_id="TwoWeeks" /> 
      </AssignConstraint> 
     </AssignPermission>  
     </AssignPermissions> 
 </PRA>  
 <PRA pra_id="pranurse" role_name="nurse_practioner"> 
    <AssignPermissions>       
     <AssignPermission perm_id="s3HL7_GET"> 
     </AssignPermission>  
    </AssignPermissions> 




Figure 4.3: Sample XPRAS* Policy Sheet written using X-GTRBAC 
                            
P* ≤ P (Where P* is the subset of P) 
 
Examining the XML permission to role assignment sheet written using X-
GTRBAC example provide better understanding of above discussion. Figure 4.2 
represents the policy sheet from actual policy (P) where as figure 4.3 represents the policy 
sheet from the subset of policy (P*).  In first figure role surgeon has been assigned three 
different permissions named as “S1HL7_GET”, “S2HL7_GET” and 
“S3HL7_GET”.However the policy sheet in figure 4.3 that is the subset of original policy 
only permission that is assigned is “S1HL7_GET”. 
This subset policy is used to enforce access control on the requests that are 
coming from the other IDC’s. Every domain can have its own role and permissions 




have included a role and permission mapping module in our system. These module maps 
role and permission definitions to new definitions that can be understood by the SLA 
access control policy. 
 
4.2 Context Capture Mechanism 
 
As already described, the context information at the time when request is initiated 
is a key parameter in access control policy evaluation. Varying contextual parameters ( 
such as  location, activity or time) need to be handled differently by access control 
mechanism. Access permissions for releasing sensitive information contents of a 
electronic health record (EHR) of a patient may need to be privileged in life threatening 
situations such as during performing a surgical procedure or handling other emergency 
situations. 
           Precise assembling of some context information can be easily made and does not 
require any additional hardware support, one such example of context is time. However 
some others like location or activity may or may not require use of some sophisticated 
hardware support. Secure federated healthcare system takes care of location as the only 
context parameter before making any access control decisions and determining the extent 
of information content be released to the requesting party. Design of a context capture 
mechanism to determine the current location of user was of some challenge. Global 
positioning system (GPS) could have been used to get the exact coordinates that can be 
used to find the precise location of querying user,  but instead of using any external 
hardware to get the location context, we have relied on functionality of already available 
open systems interconnection basic reference model ( OSI Model) and have used the 
internet protocol (IP) address of incoming request as a measure to find current location. 
Although GPS does provide a very fine resolution in terms determining the precise 
location of user, we have preferred IP based location capture system over GPS as we 
think that this technique does not require any additional support or any extra 
programming effort, and above all it is already available in the framework . IP addresses 
can be easily mapped to network address that provide domain specific information. At 
this point this information is enough to change the access privileges.  
Design of our context acquisition module consists of logical sensor to sense current 
location of source that initiated the request. Location sensor grabs the IP address of the 
incoming request that is actually helpful in finding the network address of the access 




maintains a table that has associated grouping information against a particular network 
address as shown in the table 4.1. This grouping information is used to retrieve the 
appropriate contents of a document. 
 
Table 4.1 Network Based Groups 
 




                                       
Once the IP address is captured next step is the translation of this address into 
network address. We have utilized the famous technique of sub netting  an IP address.  A 
key player in sub netting is a subnet mask that is a 32 bit address as well that actually 
divides the IP address into network and host sections. Using sub netting technique IP 
address is spitted into network and host address by performing a logical AND operation 
with subnet mask. A mapping between network address and subnets is also maintained in 
a table as shown in the following Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Network Address and Subnet Mask Relation 
 
Network Address Subnet Mask 
128.11.x.x 255.255.255.0 
128.12.x.x 255.255.255.0 
                      
 Network address and subnet mask in Table 4.2 are used to verify if the request 
was originated from a trusted domain. Algorithm listed in the Figure 4.4 is used for such 
verification.  
                              
    VerifyDomain ( IP Address ) 
                 Result = False 
 





                       vSubnet  = Get subnet mask for this row 
                       vNetwork = Get Network address for this row 
                          vNetwork_Request = Translate IP Address to Network using “vNetwork”  
 
                           If  ( vNetwork equals vNetwork_Request) 
                                                    Return Result= true 
                                      Else   
                                                    Nothing 
      End  
 
Figure 4.4  Domain Verifier Algorithm 
 
Once the domain is verified, table 4.1 is scanned to find the grouping information 
associated with that particular domain and is appended with the request to tag it based on 
the user context. This information is used by the access control processor to apply proper 
access control policy.                                         
                                 
4.3  Reference Information Model for HL7 
 
Reference Information Model forms the basis of all information definition for 
HL7 data objects [1]. The RIM model is organized using the object oriented paradigm, 
including multiple classes. At the very basic level it has three foundation classes, namely: 
Entities, Acts and Roles as depicted in Figure 4.5.  All classes that represent health care 
stakeholders and other things of interest to the health care venture are grouped under the 
Entity Class [5]. Members of this class, such as patients, physicians, nurses etc exist 
physically. Non-human objects like pathological analysis machines and environmental 
control sensors also constitute the entity class. The entity class excludes information 
structures, electronic medical records and messages. Act is an intentional action taken in 
the physical domain of HL7. Intentional actions in HL7 are the business of providing 
healthcare services. The instantiation of the Acts class is a data record. Role class defines  
the competency of an Entity. A member of the entity class plays a role and participates in 
an act. In order for a member of the Entity class to become a member of the Role class, a 
credential based role definition is done. For example a physician, member of the entity 




competencies or credentials. These credentials could be a person’s affiliation to a 
hospital, membership of a professional organization, a diploma in pediatrics etc.  
Clinical Acts is a collection of classes under Acts class which relates actions and 
events that constitute clinical care services, such as Patient Service Event and Pharmacy 
Service Event, besides others. The former deals with the type of service events in which 
healthcare services are rendered to a patient, and the later constitutes type of service event 
in which pharmacy or treatment services are performed. In order to create an illustrative 
access control policy for CDA, we have picked the Patient Service Event and Pharmacy 
Service Event classes. These two classes, besides giving us with an insight into the policy 
engineering activity, are also representative of the overall CDA documents. The Patient 
service event has a number of sub-classes. For demonstrative purposes, in this paper, we 
consider Clinical Observation, Diet and Medication. Similarly, pharmacy service event 
also has a number of sub-classes but for illustration we consider the sub-classes of 
Treatment Service Admin and Treatment Service Event. For a complete listing and  











4.4 Policy Specification 
 
Policy specification in any secure domain depends on the requirements of the 
application. The healthcare domain requires that access to information be secure and 
private in light of changing context. In order to achieve this goal, we investigate the 
permission/access footprint of the CDA documents and provide a consistent context-role-
permission association. Generally, a permission space in RBAC can be defined as user, 
role, and permission combination in the information space of the application. As depicted 
in figure 4.6, we assume two users U1 and U2. L1, L2 are the location context parameters 
like office or an emergency room. T1, T2 are the times of day. User U1 is in context L2, T2 
and U2 is in context L1, T1. We have two data objects, O1 and O2, for which the users 
require access. In addition we assign object O1 with context tagging of parameters L1 and 
T1. This implies that any user having context parameters L1 and T1 and assuming the 
appropriate role will have predefined permissions to this object. Similarly, object O2 has 
context parameters L2 and T2 tagged with it. In order for users U1 and U2 to access the 
objects O1 and O2, appropriate context parameters have to be associated with them. 
Specifically, U1 assuming role R1 having context parameters L2 and T2 will not be able to 
access object O1. Likewise, U2 will be able to access object O1 with context parameters L1 
and T1.                      
 





This tagging of context parameters to objects can also be extended to attributes 
within the objects and by virtue of this tagging, attributes from disparate objects can be 
grouped together. For example, attribute A of object O1 in Figure 2 can be tagged with the 
same context as attribute C of object O2. Effectively this will allow a user with the right 
context to access composite objects. The importance of tagging context with object 
permissions can be exemplified with a scenario from the health care environment. Under 
normal conditions, physicians may not be permitted to have full access to the EHR of a 
patient. However, in an emergency situation involving a life threatening scenario, 
physicians can be permitted to access full EHR data. 
This change in privilege acceleration can be captured by the afore mentioned 
activity context. On the other hand access can be constrained by location context for 
example, access to EHR provided only in the emergency room.  
 
4.4.1 Context Based Tagging 
 
In order to fulfill the security and privacy requirements of the CDA documents, 
we propose to use the X-GTRBAC grammar as presented in [9]. In particular, we identify 
the key information attributes in the CDA RIM and define tagging with relevant context 
parameters and user roles. The context parameters attached to each user fall in the 
categories of Activity, Identity, Location, and Time [6]. Activity in the domain of 
healthcare could be a user performing a surgical operation, carrying out an emergency 
procedure, consulting with a patient in a clinic or doing a consultation over the phone. 
The granularity of activity can be further fine grained by defining the types of surgical 
operations which is a decision left to the policy administrators and the domain specialists. 
Location in the context of healthcare can also be parameterized with user located in the 
operation theater, in the emergency room, or in his/her clinic. It may be noted here that 
location and activity, while having some semantic overlapping, define disjoint concepts. 
For example, a surgeon in the operation room (location) is expected to perform a surgical 
procedure (activity). Each of these two context types can be effectively used to provide 
fine grained access over resources. Identity in our stated domain is defined as a user 
name, an email address employee id etc. There could also be more sophisticated means of 
identifying an individual like biometrics. We also consider credentials of a user as 












       
         Role 
                 Context Parameters            Permissions 





Physician X X X X X  
Patient  X X  X  
Guarantor       
abnormal_res
ult_ind 
Physician X X X X X  
Patient  X X  X  
Guarantor       
clinical_obser
vation_id 
Physician X X X X X X 
Patient  X X  X  
Guarantor       
method_cd Physician  X X X X  
Patient  X X  X  
Lab Technician X X X X X X 
observation_
desc 
Physician X X X X X  
Patient  X X  X  
Insurance  X X X X X 
observation_
value_txt 
Physician X X X X X  
Patient  X X  X  
Registered Nurse X X X X X X 
Assistant Nurse X X X X X X 
Diet carbohydrate
_qty 
Physician X X X X X  
Patient   X   X  
Dietician X X X  X X 
Insurance X X X X X  
energy_qty Physician X X X X X  
Patient  X   X  
Dietician X X X  X X 
Preparation Staff X X X X X X 
Medication body_site_cd Physician X X X X X  
Patient X X X X X  
Pharmacist X X X X X X 
Insurance X X  X X X 
Nurse of Duty X X X X X  
dose_qty Physician X X X X X  
Patient X X X X X  
Pharmacist X X X X X X 
Insurance  X X X X X 
Nurse of Duty X X X X X  
form_cd Physician X X X X X X 
Patient X X X X X  
Pharmacist  X X X X  
Insurance X X X X X  
Nurse of Duty X X X X X X 
strength_qty Physician X X X X X  
Patient X X X X X  
Pharmacist X X X X X X 
Insurance X X X X X X 




These credentials could be a persons affiliation to a professional organization, 
his/her certification status etc. Again we can combine the Identity context with the 
activity and location context and use this combination to come up with more granular and 
precise access control policy. In order to capture this multi context specification, we 
extend our previous example of a surgeon in the operation theater (location), doing a 
surgery (activity), and because of his/her credentials (identity) is the lead surgeon as  
compared to a junior surgeon whose credentials (identity), do not allow him to perform 
certain parts of the surgery. The junior surgeon, in this case may have the same location 
and activity context as the senior surgeon. Similarly, time is also employed to further fine 
grain the security policy with the time of duty, maximum time allowed in a hazardous 
(stressful) situation etc.  
Table 4.3 provides one view of the context-role-permission association tagging, 
using the proposed framework, on various classes of CDA. The main class selected for 
this illustration is the RIM_Patient_service_event with the Clincal_observation, Diet and 
Medication sub-classes (shown in the first column of the subject table). Refer to Figure 
4.5 for its overall position in RIM. Permissions are defined for each attribute of the class, 
shown in the second column. For simplicity, not all attributes are shown in this table. As 
part of this illustration various roles are considered and access to the class attribute is 
defined depending on the context types depicted in the Context Parameters column. In 
this table, we have not elaborated on the actual context parameters, but instead have only 
listed the type of context categories applied in particular access permission. The 
permissions granted to each role are shown in the last column. The Presentation 
permission includes the right to read, right to change or the right to delete. The Execution 
permission corresponds to the context parameter triggering an executable process to start 
a predefined execution pattern. As already discussed before, all entities (defined in the 
Entity class of CDA), including machines can be assigned roles in CDA and the concept 
of context aware access control can  then be applied to these roles. As an example, an X-
ray machine in the operation theatre can transfer its data to computers in the radiologist’s 
office only when a surgical operation (activity context) is being performed. And that too 
during predefined segments (activity context) of the operation coupled with the fact that 
radiologist is in his/her office (location context) and has a certain certification rating 






4.5 Example of a CDA Policy Specification 
 
Next we demonstrate the proposed policy specification approach with the help of 
an example depicted in Figure 4.7. This example involves two users, John and Bob, 
belonging to the Entity class of CDA and having various context parameters. They both 
take on the role of the physician defined in the Role class of CDA.  
The assumption of this role is based on their credentials, which in turn are also 
viewed as context parameters. These two users access the Clinical Observation class, a 
subclass of the Acts class and based on their context parameters, different security rules 
are applied. Specifically, John with identity HL7123 (ID1) is in operation theatre 
(Location LOC1) and performing a surgical procedure (Activity ACT1) at time 1300 hrs 
(time T1). Similarly Bob, with identity HL7125 (ID2) is in his clinic (Location LOC2) 
and performing a physical examination of a patient (Activity ACT2) at 0800 hrs (time 
T2).Context information provided by John is used in assigning permissions to role. So 
physician John in the current activity context (“Surgical procedure”) is permitted to 
perform all read /write operations on all A, B, C and D attributes of class Clinical 
Observation. On the other hand physician Bob is performing activity “physical 
examination” of a patient, so permissions available to him are different from that of 
John’s. He is permitted only for C and D attributes of the same class. As mentioned 
earlier, we use the X-GTRBAC grammar for the policy specification in the healthcare 
environment. Applying this grammar to our current example results in the access control 
policy attached as appendix B. 
At the top level, this policy consists of XML User Sheet (XUS), XML Roles 
Sheet (XRS), XML Permission Sheet (XPS), XML User to Role Assignment Sheet 
(XURAS) and XML Permission to Role Assignment Sheet (XPRAS). The authenticating 
and authorization credentials used in X-GTRBAC are included in XUS and XRS, 
respectively. The definitions of the credential types used in the XUS are provided through 
the use of an XML Credential Type Definition (XCredTypeDef) sheet. The XUS, XRS 
and XCredTypeDef for the current example are given in Figure A.8, A.9 and A.3, 
respectively. 
According to XCredTypeDef, the credential type c1 constitutes the physician’s 
credentials which are “membership”, “certification”, “employ_id” and “qualification” 
which are required to assume a role from XRS. As per our definition, these credentials are 
mandatory and are annotated by “mand” usage tag. In XUS, we define the user’s 




credential based authentication of users John and Bob. In XRS, we define the roles, role 
hierarchies and enabling constraints. In our example, and as per Figure A.7, Role 
“Qualified Practitioner” is the top level role with child role of “Physician”. The Physician 
role has PTQuarterWeekOne as the enabling constraint attached to it. All periodic 
constraints, including this one, are defined in Figure A.6 as XML Temporal Constraint 
Definition (XTempConstDef). XResTypeDef in Figure A.10 is the definition of the 
resource types defined over the attributes of the selected HL 7 classes.                    
We use this definition in XPS (Figure A.7) for defining permissions on each 
resource type. Each permission is allocated an ID which corresponds to a certain 
operation the user can perform on the resources. In our case P2 (Figure A.7) stands for 

















Fig 4.7: Example of Context-Aware CDA document provisioning 
 
XURAS defines the user to role assignment for a user having certain credential 
constraints. User John (user_id U1) assumes the role physician by providing credential 
type c1 (Figure A.5). XPRAS defines the permission to role assignment for a given 
context. In our example (Figure A.1) permission P1 is assigned to attribute 
Observation_desc if the user provides context credentials c1, which includes activity, 




location parameter having value “operation room” and activity being equal to “operation” 
and time equals “13:00”. It may be noted here that c1 consists of the context of the user 



































 5.1 Access Control Software Architecture for SFH 
 
We propose a major extension of previously proposed software architecture [26] 
of the single-enterprise XML-based Web application for disseminating secure CDA 
documents. The architecture meets all the RBAC functional specifications of the NIST 
RBAC standard [10]. The key components of this architecture are discussed below.  
 
5.1.1 XML Document Composition Module (XDCM) 
 
This is the main graphical interface for composing XML schemas for RBAC 
elements and the policy administration for the healthcare enterprise objects. The same 
interface is used for composing and manipulating both sets of documents, which are then 
stored in the policy base. The Tagging sub-module is used to tag the CDA class attributes 
with context parameters and create the permission association classes. This module is 
responsible for all the administrative functions as part of the RBAC functional 
specifications.  
 
5.1.2 Access Control Module (ACM) 
 
This is the key component of the architecture. It interfaces with various other 
functional modules and information repositories from which it extracts relevant 
information while making authorization decisions. It extracts the policy information from 
the policy base and works closely with the XML Instance Generator (XIG) module to 
enforce the authorization constraints. The XIG module gets information from the ACM 
about the access permissions that are allowed on XML documents associated with an 




S        Such XML views are cached in XML Instance Base (XIB). XIG can simply be an 
extension of an XML document processor. The ACM, along with SMM, is responsible 
for all the supporting system functions that are part of the NIST RBAC functional 
specifications. 
 
5.1.3 HL7 Session Management Module (SMM) 
 
This module is responsible for monitoring the session activities. SMM captures 
relevant, dynamic context information (location, time etc) that is used to update user 
credentials that may affect future access control decisions. This information is maintained 
in the XSS, and is communicated to the ACM. The ACM accordingly updates the user 
credential information in the policy base. ACM, XIG and SMM together form the XML 
Access Control Processor (ACP).  
 Of particular significance here is the flexible session management capability of 
SMM. For instance, a paramedic in an ambulance may start a session, which may later 
need to be suspended either upon the user’s request, or due to hand-off. Here, the current 
context information needs to be stored in order to support the user’s reconnection. By the 
time reconnection is requested, some context conditions may have been changed. Such 
changes in context information need to be taken into account for granting reconnection 
requests, possibly with new set of authorizations. The capability of SMM to capture 
dynamic context information allows this feature to be incorporated. 
 
5.1.4 Object Tagging/Clustering Module 
 
 This module is responsible for maintaining tagging and clustering of all HL7 
Objects. The Role Mapper associates roles with concepts and generates the XRSs for 
these roles and their hierarchy consistent with HL7.  The module provides functionality to 
add or delete the clusters, as well as to create virtual clusters based on a new set of user 
credentials, as shown in Figure 5.1 Additionally, the classification of new documents 
entering the source is also handled by this module. A new document may be assigned to 
an existing cluster based on its conformance to the schemas composing the cluster. 







5.1.5 Authentication and Authorization 
 
  A user (health care practitioner) wishing to request clinical data from the HL7 needs 
to provide credentials defined per the federated schema as discussed in [17]. To provide a 




































Figure 5.1: Software architecture for dissemination of secure CDA documents 
 
an Authentication Manager and an Authorization Manager. The Authentication Manager 




authenticating credential to the user (encoded as an XUS in our framework, refer 
appendix B). Subsequently, this authenticating credential is presented to the 
Authorization Manager. The Authorization Manager is then responsible for role 
assignment of the user request based on the attributes encoded in the user credential. 
Following a successful role assignment, the Authorization Manager issues an 
authorization credential to the user (encoded as an XRS in our framework, refer appendix 
B). Since the Authorization Manager issues the credential defined per the federated 
schema, hence the authorization credential issued by it is accepted at all federating sites 
within the Secure federated healthcare. The fact that the role assignment is done based on 
the attributes (and not the identity) of the user, and that the users and roles are defined 
using credentials as per the federated schema makes this a scalable mechanism, since any 
user can be assigned to any role within a federating site based on its local access control 
policy. 
 
5.1.6 Credential Evaluator, Role Mapper  
 
 The Credential Evaluator module evaluates the credentials presented by the 
ACM. It additionally assigns the user to an existing credential/competency type, or 
creates a new credential type if the user credentials do not match any existing credential 
specifications. With the help of the Role Mapper, it maps the credentials to a role using 
the assigned credential type. 
 
5.1.7 Context Acquisition Module 
 
The Context acquisition module evaluates the contextual information provided by 
the ACM and sends relevant information to be used in access decision to the Secure 
federated healthcare policy base. This module consists of two major components (i) 
context capture module and (ii) context based tagging module. Context Capture module 
contains context sensor that are used to identify the current context of request. Secure 
federated healthcare context capture module contains DateTime sensor and location 
sensor. DateTime sensor is used to capture the date and time of the request however 
location sensor extracts the IP address from incoming request. Date and time from 
DateTime sensor is passed to context expression generator. Location sensor pass the 
location information to IP2Network address translator that translates the IP address to a 




requesting party. Network address is then passed over to context expression generator that 
generates a context expression that is used by policy base to determine the context based 
access control. 
  Context based tagging module upon receiving the context expression, looks up its 
mapping table against the network address embedded in the context expression to find a 
network address and its associated tag. If there is a match it appends this tag with the 
credential expression and sends it to request router for proper routing. 
 
5.1.8 Request Router, SLA Enforcer 
 
 Request router plays an important role of routing request to policy base. Request 
router reads the context expression and determines if the request is coming remotely or 
locally. If request was generated locally , it routes the request to normal access control 
policy base so that normal access control policy be applied otherwise request is sent to 
SLA enforcer which applies only a subset of system policy. SLA enforcer consists of a 
role and permission mapper and a SLA policy. All the remote requests are handled by this 
SLA enforcer, it maps the role and permission definitions and the applies only the subset 
of system policy to maintain the appropriate level of privacy and security. 
 
5.1.9 HL 7 Object Base 
 
 The HL 7 Object Base constitutes the physical objects present in the system from 
which the XML documents are composed. The XML Schemas and Instances contains 
actual XML sources to which the user will be requesting access. The Policy Base contains 
all policy related XML objects clustered/tagged by XDCM. The information content 
needed for all review functions per the RBAC functional specifications is retrievable 
from the Policy Base, with support from SMM and role hierarchy components as needed. 
These policy documents are in the form of policy sheets and each addresses a subset of 
the overall policy semantics. Examples of these policy sheets are in appendix A.  
 
5.2 Secure Federated Health Care System Demo 
 
This sub section highlights the functionality of our implemented secure federated 
context aware and content based health care system. This is a web based system, user 




system for further processing. The access control policy has been implemented using the 
X-GTRBAC policy specification. This system evaluates the user requests for accessing 
secure information against this policy. This system has been designed to take care of the 
location context while applying the access control policy, however it can be easily 
extended to consider other contextual parameters such as time, identity and activity into 
account as well. It constantly monitors the location context of user and as soon as it 
detects a change in context, users request are revaluated against system policy with the 
new context information.  
  
 

















Figure 5.2 Secure Federated Healthcare System 
 
This system works with multiple access control policies to handle local and 
remote requests. We call these policies as local and federated policy that is also named as 
service level agreement policy. Federated policy is different from the local policy as it is 




constraints set by local policy on any domain. Figure 5.2 provides the main graphical 
interface of our application. Roles are selected from the role drop down menu in the left, 
then credentials are provided that are evaluated to enforce the policy. One has to select a 
domain from D1 and D2, where D2 is being used to simulate the remote domain. Record 
Types are actually the attributes of a patient XML record that is in compliance with the 
HL7 CDA standards. Let us explain this with the help of an example. 
1) User selects the role that he wants to assume, provides the credentials, specify 
patient ID and the particular record type attribute that he wants to access from this 
particular patient medical record. This information is then sent to the secure federate 















                        Figure 5.3 Access Control Decision (Permit) of SFH system 
 
2) User context is captured using the context acquisition module and other 
information obtained in step 1 is parsed from the user request and is converted to security 
assertion markup language (SAML) request. Context acquisition module also tags this 
request and creates a context expression based on the current request’s context. This 
information is used by the access control processor to decide between the local and 




control processor evaluates the request against system policy and decision is displayed to 















Figure 5.4 Access Control Decision (Denial) of  
SFH System 
Figure 5.3 provides us the following information. Role surgeon has been 
authorized to access resource “RES_CD” with the permission “GET” . Provided 
credential set, time, session information and IP address has also been supplied with the 
final decision. Similarly denial decision is shown in Figure 5.4. 
3) In case of permit decision, patient record database (containing hundreds of   XML 
patient records) is queried and the information is filtered to create a new view for the 


















































In this thesis, we have proposed the software architecture of a secure federated 
context-aware content-based access control policy specification framework for the 
healthcare domain using the X-GTRBAC policy specification language. This language 
correspond to the model proposed in GTRBAC an extension to famous RBAC model. All 
the feature that are available in the RBAC and its temporal extensions are also available 
in X-GTRBAC. This policy language can be applied to any general domain, but due to 
growing concerns of privacy and security in health care domain, we design our system for 
secure federated healthcare system only 
In particular we have followed the CDA document structure of the HL7 that is 
ANSI-certified standard from the Health Level Seven (HL7) organization. CDA 
documents has already been written using xml (although other representations (pdf, word 
doc, jpg etc) are also available) that has made our job easy to apply our access control 
policy directly at the attributes level of such documents. In order to fulfill the security and 
privacy requirements of the CDA documents, we have proposed to use the X-GTRBAC 
grammar as presented in [9]. In particular, we have identified the key information 
attributes in the CDA RIM and define tagging with relevant context parameters and user 
roles. Our federated health care system uses both user and environmental contextual 
parameters in determining the real context based access control. We have identified 
location, identity, activity and time as potential contextual candidates. Change in context 
can result in changing the level of access already available. To address all such issues our 
framework uses the tagging of context information with CDA classes to create a 
permission space, based on context of the user. The resulting context-role-permission 
association provides a highly granular and flexible way of specifying access control 
policies in a generic form.   
We have also discussed  Secure federated healthcare architecture, that is an 
upgraded version of previously proposed software architecture [26] of the single-
enterprise XML-based Web application, for disseminating secure CDA documents. The 




have also introduced the concept of service level agreements that serves as a rule book for 
distributed domain who want to collaborate. We have also discussed the design 
specification for this service level agreement document. We have also used X-GTRBAC  
policy specification language in the design of such document. This document is actually a 
subset of actual policy deriving the system along with some other important components 
that are used to map roles and permissions among different domain in collaboration.   
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A. X-GTRBAC Grammar 









































 [Basic Definitions] 
<!-- Policy Definition> ::= 
<Policy policy_id=(xs:id) policy_name=(xs:name)> 
<!-- XML Credential Type Definitions> 
<!-- XML Separation of Duty Definitions> 
<!-- XML Temporal Constraint Definitions> 
<!-- XML Predicate Function Definitions> 
<!-- XML Resource Type Definitions> 
<!-- XML Resource Type Sheet> 
<!-- XML User Sheet> 
<!-- XML Role Sheet> 
<!-- XML Permission Sheet> 
<!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet> 
<!-- XML Permission-Role Assignment Sheet> 
</Policy> 
<!-- XML Credential Type Definitions > ::= 
<XCredTypeDef xctd_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- Credential Type Definition>}* 
</XCredTypeDef> 
<!-- Credential Type Definition> ::= 
<CredTypeDef cred_type_id = (xs:id) 
cred_type_name= (xs:name) > 
<!—Attribute List> 
</CredTypeDef> 
<!—Attribute List > ::= <AttributeList> 
{<!-- Attribute Definition>}* 
</AttributeList > 
<!-- Attribute Definition> :: 
<AttributeDef name=(xs: name) usage= mand | opt 
type = xs:dateTime | xs:string | xs:integer /> 
<!-- XML User Sheet> ::= <XUS xus_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- User Definition>}* 
</XUS> 





<!—CredType > ::= 
<CredType cred_type_id = (xs:idref) 
cred_type_name= (xs:name) > 
[<!—Header>] 
<!-- Credential Expression> 
</CredType> 
<!-- Credential Expression > ::= <CredExpr> 
{<!-- Attribute >}* 
</CredExpr> 
<!-- Attribute> ::= <Attribute name= (xs:name)> 
value= (xs:dateTime | xs:string | xs:integer) /> 
<!-- XML Role Sheet> ::= <XRS xrs_id = (xs:id)> 
{<!-- Role Definition>}* 
</XRS> 
<!-- Role Definition> ::= 
<Role role_id = (xs:id) role_name = (xs:name)> 
[<!-- Cred Type>] 
[<!—(En|Dis)abling Constraint>] 
[<!—[De]Activation Constraint>] 
{<SSDRoleSetId> (xs:idref) </SSDRoleSetId>}* 
{<DSDRoleSetId> (xs:idref) </DSDRoleSetId>}* 
[<JuniorRoleId>(xs:idref) </JuniorRoleId>] 
[<SeniorRoleId>(xs:idref) </SeniorRoleId>] 
{<!—Linked Role ID>}* 
[<!—Delegation Constraint>] 
[<Cardinality> (xs:integer) </Cardinality>] 
</Role> 
<!—Linked Role ID> ::= <LinkedRoleId id= (xs:idref) 
type=delegator | delegatee /> 
<!-- XML Separation of Duty Definitions> 




<!-- SSDRoleSets > ::= <SSDRoleSets> 
{<!—SSDRoleSet>}+ 
</SSDRoleSets> 
<!—SSDRoleSet> ::= <SSDRoleSet 
ssd_role_set_id 
= (xs:id) 
ssd_cardinality = (xs:integer)> 
{<SSDRoleId>(xs:idref)</SSDRoleId>}+ 
</SSDRoleSet> 






dsd_cardinality = (xs:integer)> 
{<DSDRoleId>(xs:idref)</DSDRoleId>}+ 
</DSDRoleSet> 
<!-- XML Permission Sheet>::= <XPS xps_id = (xs:id) 
> 
{<!-- Permission Definition>}+ 
</XPS> 
<!-- Permission Definition> ::= 
<Permission perm_id =(xs:id) [prop= 
noprop|first_level|cascade ] > 





<!-- Resource Type Definitions > ::= 
<XResTypeDef xrtd_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!—Resource Type Definition>}* 
</XResTypeDef> 
<!-- Resource Type Definition> 
::= <ResTypeDef res_type_id = (xs:id) 
res_type_name= (xs:name) > 
<!-- Attribute List> 
</ResTypeDef > 
<!-- XML Resource Type Sheet>::= 
<XRTS xrts_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- Resource Type>}* 
</XRTS> 
<!-- Resource Type> ::= 
<ResType res_type_id = (xs:idref) 
res_type_name = (xs:name)> 
{<!—Attribute>}* 
</ResType> 
<!-- Operation> ::= <Operation> 
(saml:Action)</Operation> 
<!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet>::= 
<XURAS xuras_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- User-role Assignment>}* 
</XURAS> 
<!-- User-role Assignment>::= 
<URA ura_id=(xs:id) role_id=(xs:idref)> 
{< !—[De]Assign User>}+ 
</URA> 

















































[<!—[De]Assign Constraint >] 
</[De]AssignUser> 
<!-- XML Permission-Role Assignment Sheet>::= 
<XPRAS xpras_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- Permission-Role Assignment>}* 
</XPRAS> 
<!-- Permission-Role Assignment>::= 
<PRA pra_id=(xs:id) role_id=(xs:idref)> 
{< !—[De]Assign Permission>}+ 
</PRA> 
< !—[De]Assign Permission> ::= 
<[De]AssignPermission perm_id=(xs:idref)> 
[<!—[De]Assign Constraint >] 
</[De]AssignPermission> 
<!—[De]Assign Constraint> ::= 
<[De]AssignConstraint[op = AND|OR|NOT]> 
// opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
{<!—[De] Assign Condition>}+ 
</[De]AssignConstraint> 




[<!-- Logical Expression>] 
</[De]AssignCondition> 
<!—(En|Dis)abling Constraint> ::= 
<(En|Dis)abConstraint[op = AND|OR|NOT]> 
// opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
{<!-- (En|Dis)abling Condition>}+ 
</(En|Dis)abConstraint> 




[<!-- Logical Expression>] 
</(En|Dis)abCondition> 
<!—[De]Activation Constraint> ::= 
<[De] ActivConstraint[op = AND|OR|NOT]> 
// opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
{<!—[De]ActivationCondition>}+ 
</[De]ActivConstraint> 
<!—[De]Activation Condition> ::= 
<[De]ActivCondition [d_expr_id=(xs:idref)]> 
<!-- Logical Expression>] 
</[De]ActivCondition > 
<!-- Logical Expression> ::= 
<LogicalExpr [op = AND|OR|NOT]> 
// opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
{<!-- Predicate>}+ 
</LogicalExpr> 
<!-- Predicate>::= <Predicate> 
<!-- PredicateBlock> | < !--LogicalExpression> 
</Predicate> 
<!-- PredicateBlock>::= <PredicateBlock> 





<!-- XML Predicate Function Definitions>::= 
<XPredFuncDef xpfd_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!-- Function Definition>}* 
</XPredFuncDef> 
<!—Function Definition>::= <Function func_id = 
(xs:id) 




<!—Parameter List>::= <ParameterList> 
{<!-- Parameter>}* 
</ParameterList > 
<!-- Parameter> ::= <Parameter order= (xs:int) 
type = xs:string|xs:int|xs:date / > 
[Temporal Definitions] 
<!-- XML Temporal Constraint Definitions >::= 
<XTempConstDef xtcd_id = (xs:id) > 
{<!—Interval Expression>}* 
{<!-- Periodic Time Expression>}* 
{<!-- Duration Expression>}* 
</XTempConstDef> 
<!-- Periodic Time Expression> ::= 
<PeriodicTimeExpr pt_expr_id = (xs:id) 
[d_expr_id = (xs:idref)] [i_expr_id = (xs:idref)] 
> 
<!-- Start Time Expression> 
</PeriodicTimeExpr> 
<!—Interval Expression> ::= 




<!-- Start Time Expression> ::= <StartTimeExpr 








(represents # of months from the start of current 
Year) 
</MonthSet > 
<!--WeekSet> ::= <WeekSet> 
{<Week>1|..|5</Week>}1-5 
(represents # of weeks from the start of current 
Month) 
</WeekSet > 
<!--DaySet> ::= <DaySet> 
{<Day>1|..|7</Day>}1-7 
(represents # of days from the start of current Week) 
</DaySet > 
<!-- Duration Expression> ::= 





<!--Header> ::= <Header> 
<Principal><!-- NameID></Principal> 
<Issuer> <!-- NameID></Issuer> 
<!-- Validity> 
[<DSig> <!-- Signature ></DSig>] 
</Header> 
<!-- NameID>::= (saml:NameID) 






<!-- Signature > ::= (ds:Signature) 
<!—Delegation Constraint> ::= 
<DelegationConstraint [op = AND|OR|NOT]> 
// opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
{<!-- Delegation Condition>}+ 
</DelegationConstraint> 
<!—Delegation Condition> ::= 
<DelegationCondition [pt_expr_id=(xs:idref) | 
d_expr_id=(xs:idref)] > 

















































<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 




































Figure A.3: Definition of  Physician_cred  
and nurse_cred credentials . 
 
 
















Figure A.2: This temporal constraint definition includes a 
periodic time expression (PTE) which states that the access 
is allowed beginning the first week of every quarter of year 
2005.Note that duration expression and/or interval 
expression are referenced inside a PTE. 
 





































































Figure A.1: This is a permission assignment 



















































































Figure A.8: This is the definition of a particular 
 instance of the credentials defined in Figure A.4. It 
 is submitted by any user having the required credential. 
 The credential contains  authenticating attributes for 
 the user that are used in the assignment policy of  
Figure A.8 for user-role-assignment. 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<XReS xres_id = “HL7_XRES“ > 
<Resource res_type_id = ”HL7CLO” 
res_type_name = 
” Clinical_Observation”> 




Figure A.4: This is the definition of an instance of the 
resource type 
ClinicPurdueResClinicalDocument. The 
resource is  identified using the url value of the id 
attribute, which points to a resource instance belonging to 
patient Alen. This instance will be stored in the EHR 
database. 














Figure A.7: This is the definition of the permissions 
Presentation,Execution and Tagging. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<XURAS xuras_id="HL7_XURAS"> 
































Figure A.5: This is a role assignment policy for the 



































Figure A.6: This is the definition of predicate function 
hasCredAttributeValue 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<XRS xrs_id="HL7_XRS">             
  <ParentRole role_id="QP" role_name= 
"Qualified Practitioner">                  
<ChildRole role_id="Phy" role_name= 
"Physician"/> 
<ChildRole role_id="Nur" role_name= 
"Nurse"/></ParentRole> 
















Figure A.9: This is the definition of the role 
Qualified Practitioner  
(Physician, nurse etc )it  
includes the definition of a particular instance  
of the credential  Physician_cred,nurse_cred 
so on defined in Figure A.4. The credential contains 
authorization attributes for the role that are used in the 
assignment policy of Figure A.3 for permission-role-
assignment. Note that the value of role attributes is 
captured dynamically by the system and 
hence is not explicitly stated in the role definition. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<XResTypeDef xrtd_id = “HL7_XRTD“ > 
<ResTypeDef res_type_id = ”HL7CLO” 
res_type_name =”Clinical_Observation”> 
<AttributeList> 
<Attribute name="id" type="anyURI"/> 
<Attribute name="abnormal_result_cd" 
type="string" /> 








Figure A.10: This is the definition of a resource type 
ClinicalObservation.it definesa set of  attributes of 
type string with anyURL. Attributes may be used to qualify 
the resources for fine-grained access control. 
 
